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Abstract 
My thesis aims to dissect the confounding factors that lead to the build up of social 
tension between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese population. The three main 
causes of this tension are the major increase in the wealthy population within China, 
Hong Kong’s “autonomous” political status, and Hong Kong’s resource constraints. 
My thesis also aims to provide suitable solutions to diminish or extinguish the 
tension and give a logical prediction of Hong Kong’s economic, political and social 
outlook in the upcoming years.  
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 5 
Introduction 
The relationship between Hong Kong and China is a difficult one to understand. 
The economic relationship is perhaps the cornerstone of the cooperation. Hong 
Kong has long been the world’s economic gateway into China and the economic 
partnership between the two has been crucial to the economic prosperity of the 
region and the country. The political relationship is best defined by the innovative 
“one country two systems” policy after 1997. It is innovative in the sense that, under 
special circumstances, a city was given the privilege to maintain its own 
“autonomous” government. Unfortunately, the social or cultural relationship has 
suffered at the expense of the progression of the economic and political partnership. 
The reason for this is because social and cultural problems cannot be fixed by 
growth and policies. It is a matter of human integration and assimilation that cannot 
be measured by any metric and potentially the most important puzzle piece to 
creating a productive and efficient synergy between Hong Kong and China. 
“What happens when an immovable object collides with an unstoppable force?” 
In such a ridiculous and outlandish scenario, would or could there be a winner? Would it 
end in a stalemate? Or would it end in mutual destruction? The fact of the matter is, how 
can an immovable object and an unstoppable force both exist on the same plain? If an 
object is immovable, it is therefore not possible for an unstoppable force to exist and vice 
versa. This scenario is known as the “Irresistible force paradox”, it is a hypothetical 
situation that labels such as “immovable” or “unstoppable” are bogus and are merely 
states of mind. In the minds of “Hong Kongers”, their resolve is immovable; their 
influence is immeasurable, and their identity is unique. In the minds of the Mainland 
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Chinese, their progress is unstoppable; their authority is absolute, and their reach is 
unlimited. Presently, there is a growing conflict between the Hong Kong and Chinese 
people. It is a conflict that has the potential to greatly damage the future cooperation and 
partnership of two economic powerhouses. The emergence of this social tension is most 
commonly attributed to a polarized society where a large minority group faces a majority 
group. In Hong Kong case, after 99 years of colonization by the British, the Hong Kong 
culture has created a unique, non-Chinese identity, and this social tension is perhaps 
caused by the post-colonization and re-integration with Hong Kong’s origins, China. The 
social and cultural tension between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese people has 
developed due to the collective influences from China's rapidly growing economy, Hong 
Kong's economic integration with China and "autonomous" political status, and its 
territorial and resource constraints.  
 The Sino-Hong Kong relationship is an unavoidable and involuntary union. Hong 
Kong was a part of an agreement from the Treaty of Nanking at the end of the first opium 
war in 1842, between China and the British Empire. It was to become a colony of the 
British Empire for 99 years and have its sovereignty transferred back to the China at the 
end of the term. Prior to British rule, Hong Kong was developing port city with a 
population of under 8,000. Today, Hong Kong has a population of seven million and has 
developed into an international economic powerhouse (Horlemann).  
Prior to the handover of Hong Kong, there was a lot of debate over how to handle 
the issue of Hong Kong sovereignty between China and England. In 1984, the Sino-
British Joint Declaration was created and signed by Deng Xiaoping and Margaret 
Thatcher (Horlemann). The objective of the declaration was to preserve Hong Kong’s 
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existing territorial integrity by making Hong Kong a special administrative region, giving 
birth to the concept and execution of One Country Two System. According to the 
declaration, Hong Kong’s sovereignty and administrative institutions would remain intact 
for 50 years, starting from handover. The declaration also set the date of the handover on 
July 1st, 1997.  
In 1997, Britain’s lease on Hong Kong territory was over. Though British gained 
control over Hong Kong through somewhat scandalous means, many of the policies 
implemented by the British had done wonders for the growth of Hong Kong, not only in 
terms of economy, but also in terms of culture and identity. A century of English rule 
forged a unique duel identity. England had gained control of Hong Kong when it was still 
a tiny and insignificant island. They gave the island purpose; they made a miniscule dot 
stand out on every map. In many ways, England is solely responsible for Hong Kong’s 
tremendous progress. The Hong Kong people had grown superficially attached to the 
England administration and had fallen victim to a bad case of Stockholm syndrome, 
which is a scenario when hostages develop empathy for their captors. They feared the 
transition to Chinese rule. During the time of the handover, China’s communist 
government was still under a lot of scrutiny for what happened in Tiananmen Square. 
They were often criticized for their centralized government and harsh rule. And the 
international community feared that Hong Kong, an important international economic 
hub, would fall victim to China’s suppression.  
As 1997 drew near, many Hong Kong citizens feared the transfer of their 
sovereignty to the People Republic of China. They had confidence in the protection of 
personal liberties and rights and many people, especially civil servants and businessmen, 
 8 
sought a way out. However, England realized that a mass exodus of key economic and 
political figures could incite turmoil within the Hong Kong economy and administration. 
By 1994, 3% of Hong Kong’s labor force had immigrated to a foreign country. Countries, 
such as the United States, Canada and Australia received overwhelming numbers of 
immigration requests from Hong Kong. According to a China Morning Post news report 
from 1995, it was projected that by 1997, 1 in 10 Hong Kong people would have acquired 
foreign nationality (Goldammer). Local companies were even beginning to set up 
overseas offices, to accommodate growing immigration concerns. In order to prevent the 
imminent implosion within Hong Kong, the English government offered 50,000 
households, up to 225,000 people, the right of abode in England without having to leave 
Hong Kong, making an exception for the 50,000 households by waiving the country’s 
residency requirements (Goldammer). Prior to 1997, potential Hong Kong immigrants 
became highly sought after commodities. Countries viewed the opportunity as a chance 
to enhance their own economic standing by selling their citizenship or lowering residency 
requirements to attract prospective immigrants. Seychelles, an African island located in 
the Indian Sea, was selling their citizenship for 10,000 rupee ($2,000 USD). Even more 
prominent and wealthy places, such as Taiwan, were willing to lower their required 
remittance and savings rate to lure these prospective immigrants (Goldammer). Canada, 
the recipient of highest number of Hong Kong immigrants during the period of the mid 
90s, had a simple way of obtaining a Canadian passport by investing in the Royal Bank 
of Canada’s immigration fund for 5 years. Ad-campaigns for Canadian telecom 
companies were targeted at Hong Kong immigrants who made many overseas calls. The 
Canadian Imperial Bank had a designated Asian banking center located near the 
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Chinatown of Calgary and various other cities (Goldammer). Currently, approximately 
20% of Canada’s population is made up of Chinese immigrants, with a majority of the 
20% made up of Hong Kong-Chinese immigrants and the majority of them immigrating 
around the early to mid-90s (Goldammer).  
 After 15 years of maintaining the One Country Two System policy, Hong Kong 
appears to have managed to maintain its autonomous status and has continued to establish 
itself to be an economic powerhouse. Hong Kong citizens are no longer actively seeking 
to leave, and immigration into Hong Kong has actually increased, due to the visa-free 
benefits that the Hong Kong passport holds with many major countries and regions. On a 
macro level, Hong Kong seems to be making steady strides toward maintaining its utopia. 
On a micro level, turmoil and unrest are ever present. Hong Kong is presently battling a 
major identity crisis, one that extends to the depths of its social and cultural roots. After 
the handover in 1997, the Hong Kong people were incredibly resistant to assimilating 
with the Mainland Chinese. They believed themselves to be superior, more educated and 
more cultured than the Mainland Chinese, and in 1997, they may have been true. Hong 
Kong people were definitely exposed to and spoiled with better benefits and higher 
standards of living. During this time, Hong Kong was China’s greatest source of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which meant that China’s economy was hugely dependent on 
Hong Kong’s economy. China’s economy was still not yet fully open and still running on 
a very limited form of capitalism. Today, China is the fastest growing and second largest 
economy in the world, only trailing the United States. Its economy is slowly shedding its 
dependence on Hong Kong’s economy and the country’s wealth and standard of living 
has improved substantially. That “superiority” that Hong Kong felt it had over the 
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Mainland Chinese is diminishing. The two are now on equal ground and this has created 
an incredible amount of tension between the two. 
As a Hong Kong native, the city’s wellbeing is naturally at the top of my list of 
major concerns. It is my duty as a Hong Kong citizen to familiarize myself with the city’s 
economic, political and social climate. And since the 1997 handover, the developing 
relationship between Mainland China and Hong Kong has been the focal point of all 
facets of discussion. Their complex relationship not only holds the key to the future 
prosperity of Hong Kong but also holds the key to redefining Hong Kong as “Chinese” 
city. 
My main goal for this thesis is to clearly dissect the growing social tension 
between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese. The reason I have chosen this particular 
focus, is because this social tension has created an incredible amount of resentment in 
both parties towards the other. If this negative sentiment from both parties continues to 
worsen, it will hinder the chances of forming a mutually beneficial or synergetic 
partnership between Hong Kong and China and put Hong Kong’s future wellbeing in 
serious doubt. I believe the three main causes of the growing resentment are China’s 
rapidly growing economy, Hong Kong’s “autonomous” political status, and Hong Kong’s 
resource constraints. The next step is to find suitable and effective solutions that could 
improve Sino-Hong Kong relations on a domestic and community level by understanding 
the existing Sino-Hong Kong relationship. 
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Chapter 1 – Money Can’t Buy Happiness 
 
 The economic dependence of Hong Kong on China and economic dependence 
of China on Hong Kong has been an important factor in the development of China’s 
economic and the region’s development. Since Hong Kong’s 1997 handover, 
economic integration between the Hong Kong and Chinese economy has been a 
much-discussed topic. However, before full economic integration can be achieved, 
both parties much be working toward the same objective and both parties must be 
completely willing and happy cooperate. Recent social tension that has developed 
between the Hong Kong and Chinese people may hinder the progression of a fully 
integrated economy. And one of the main causes of this social tension is China’s 
rapidly developing economy. 
In recent years, China has made giant strides towards eventually becoming 
the largest economy in the world. In the process, China’s rapid economic 
development has facilitated and engineered the creation of a generation of 
“Nouveau Riche” that has created a major divide in the social and cultural 
development of the nation. This new generation of wealth is very much 
concentrated in the southeastern part of the country particularly in the Pearl River 
Delta Region. In 2001, the Pearl River Delta region, which includes areas such as 
Guangdong and Shenzhen, was home to only 3.3% of the nations population, but 
accounted for 8.7% of the nation’s GDP, 24% of the nation’s FDI and most 
impressive of all, 34.1% of the nation’s exports (Chen, Xiangming). The main reason 
for the region’s affluence is due to its proximity to Hong Kong. Due to a lack of space 
in Hong Kong, much of the city’s manufacturing sector was moved across the border 
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during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In the 1980s, Hong Kong’s 
manufacture labor force 
declined from 1 million 
workers down to 250,000 
workers. In 1997, Hong 
Kong’s manufacturing 
employment fell below 
200,000, to account for only about 5.4% of the city’s entire work force. And in 2003, 
close to 10 million jobs were created by 53,000 Hong Kong-invested factories in the 
Pearl River Delta region (Chen, Xiangming). While this is not the full extent of Hong 
Kong’s business partnership with China, it is certainly enough evidence that both 
parties play a crucial role in the other’s economic progression. 
China’s economy has made many drastic changes since the Maoist years of 
the Chinese Communist Party and it is important to understand the country’s 
historical economic development in order to better comprehend its modern day 
economic status. In 1949, after Mao had just risen to power after defeating Chiang 
Kaishek and the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War, Mao implemented China’s 
first Five Year Plan in 1953, which was adopted from the Soviet economic model of 
centralized planning and state owned sectors (Horlemann). The purpose of this first 
Five Year Plan was to stimulate economic growth with a strong emphasis on heavy 
industrials, such as iron and steel production. That first year of the Five Year Plan 
resulted in real GDP growth of 15.6%, which was partially due to the land reforms 
Figure 1 Hong Kong’s Labor migration 
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put in place by Mao. The next four years produced real GDP growth of 4.2%, 6.8%, 
15% and 5.1% (China’s GDP Growth – China Economic and Business News). As 
Mao’s first economic initiative, the Five Year Plan was exceptionally successful in 
establishing a solid foundation in the industrial sector of the country’s economy. 
Mao’s second economic initiative, perhaps the most well known and 
infamous, is the Great Leap Forward. It was an economic and social campaign that 
lasted three years from 1958 – 1961. Its aim was to shift some of the economic 
decision making to more provincial level, in an attempt to decentralize the authority 
of the central government. The campaign’s target was utilize the country’s massive 
population and labor force to create a production boom in all sectors, was particular 
focuses in industrial and agricultural growth. The plan was to “leap” into economic 
prosperity, but due to an insufficient amount of capital and resources to sustain the 
large amounts of investment into the rapid industrialization of the country, the 
country fell into deep crisis. The campaign was fundamentally flawed in the sense 
that its use of commune systems and collectivization took away the labor forces’ 
incentive to work hard for the betterment of the nation.  Many agricultural 
communities greatly exaggerated or lied about their levels of production just to 
please the central government; much of the nation’s capital was then diverted to 
focus on steel production. The government took the grain that had been harvested 
and used it to supply towns, cities and exports, leaving miniscule amounts for the 
peasants. This caused the Great Chinese Famine, resulting in a death toll speculated 
to be as high as 30 million. The Great Leap Forward was then followed by the 
Cultural Revolution, which further disrupted economic development. 
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In the late 70s – the early 80s, when Deng Xiaoping came to power after 
Mao’s death, this was the turning point in China’s economic progress. His first order 
of business was to reform China’s agricultural sector by abolishing Mao’s commune 
system and establish privately owned plots of land, where farmers had to give a 
certain level of production to the state but were allowed to keep any surpluses, 
which gave farmers a great incentive to increase productivity; this was known as the 
Household–responsibility system. This was the answer to China’s problem with food 
shortages and was also the beginning of strong development within the agricultural 
system. These reforms would reach urban industries as well. State-owned industries 
were also now allowed to sell surpluses above the production quota. Private 
business were allowed to be operate for the first time since Communist rule and the 
establishment of special economic zones opened the country up to foreign 
investment for the first time since the Kuomintang’s reign. 
During this time, Hong Kong’s economic development was shifting. Its 
manufacturing sector was a crucial section of the economy but by the 1970s, much 
of the city’s manufacturing businesses had moved across the border to China and 
the city was then transformed into a financial center. By the mid 1970s, Hong Kong 
already assumed a crucial role in China’s economic development. It acted as a 
gateway or a nexus into China’s market, where multinational businesses, resources 
and capital would have to go through Hong Kong in order to reach China.  At the 
time, China’s manufacturing sector was booming due to the country’s excess land 
and cheap labor. A common business set-up at the time was that multinational 
businesses would set up regional headquarters in Hong Kong in order to manage 
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company’s investments and the production process, which was entirely based in 
China. These products would then be packaged and shipped from Hong Kong to the 
world markets. This is also the reason why many of Hong Kong-invested factories 
are set-up in the Pearl River Delta region. The proximity of the two locations allows 
products to be transported easily and at cheaper costs.  
This economic synergy between Hong Kong and China has been mutually 
beneficial for many years. In recent years, the status quo has been changing, shifting 
in favor of China. The economic dependence between the two is diminishing and 
Hong Kong will be the one that suffers. In the 1980s – 1990s, companies who 
outsourced China’s factories for mass production would ship raw materials through 
Hong Kong because that was the only gateway into China. However, with the 
increasing “openness” of the Chinese economic and trade policies, these raw 
materials no longer have to go through Hong Kong. Now, these companies now have 
direct interaction with the Chinese production sites and a lot of these raw materials 
have also been increasingly sourced locally. Also, because of the increased 
connection between these companies and the Mainland, many companies now also 
have regional offices in large metropolitan Chinese cities such as Shanghai, to 
oversee operations in China. Due to growing economic connections with China, 
many of Hong Kong’s former functions and advantages, can now also be found in the 
Mainland.  
With the diminishing need for Hong Kong’s economic expertise, Hong Kong 
has merely become a tourist destination for China and the tourist numbers have 
been astronomical. In 2007, there were approximately 15 million Chinese tourists 
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who went to Hong Kong, and in 2011, 
there were approximately 28 million, 
close to a 100% increase in just 4 years 
(see figure 2). There are a few reasons 
for the increase. Firstly, the major 
increase in the nation’s wealth has 
given the country much greater 
spending power not only on a national 
level but also on a personal level. 
Secondly, border regulation between Hong Kong and China has been relaxed 
considerably in attempt to forge a stronger connection between the two. Thirdly, 
Hong Kong’s (lack of) tax laws give the Mainland Chinese more incentive to spend 
large amounts of money when on holiday in Hong Kong.  
China’s diminished financial dependence, or rather increased financial 
independence has put Hong Kong’s role as an Asian business hub in jeopardy. Much 
of Hong Kong’s growth in economic achievement and reputation in the past decades 
has been mainly attributed to the city’s integral role in China’s business model. 
Multinational corporations that plan to establish their business in the Mainland now 
no longer have to do so by setting up their regional offices in Hong Kong. These 
companies now elect to have their regional offices within China as well. 
Furthermore, since China is such a large country in terms of land, resources and 
capital, and is still considered a developing country, there is much more opportunity 
Figure 2 China tourists statistics 
Sourrce: npr.org – For Hong Kong and Mainland, 
Distrust only grows 
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and potential for innovation and entrepreneurship. Hong Kong, on the other hand, 
faces a limited supply of land and resources to satisfy the needs of their own people. 
It seems as if Hong Kong has reached the limit of its development potential, where 
industries such as real estate and manufacturing, that once dominated the Hong 
Kong market, almost have zero growth potential. This is evident when the many of 
the large Hong Kong real estate companies, such as Shui On or Sun Heung Kai, have 
a large portion of their business based in large Chinese cities such as Shanghai or 
Chongqing.  
While Hong Kong is still home to many of Asia’s largest companies, this 
growing business trend has led to increased emphasis on Hong Kong’s financial and 
service industries. This shift could be quite problematic for Hong Kong’s future. 
Financial industries are largely based on the volume of the market and the activity 
of the stock exchange. The city’s stock market will only continue to grow if 
companies choose to list their companies there.  However, cities like Shanghai and 
Singapore already have plans to greatly expand the magnitude of their stock 
exchanges, which could result in Hong Kong losing its claim on Asia’s premier stock 
exchange. The service industry is solely based on consumption and Hong Kong’s 
service industry is largely based on the city’s tourism. Hong Kong’s tourist 
attractions do not only include the shopping, but tourist hotspots such as Victoria 
Harbor, the Peak or even Disneyland draw many visitors, especially Chinese visitors 
each year. As a result of rapid economic growth, many large Chinese cities now have 
major development plans. For example, Shanghai has plans to build a Disneyland as 
well, but the Disneyland does not have the same land constraints as the one in Hong 
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Kong. The city can afford to create a theme park that is multitudes larger than the 
one in Hong Kong. If major Chinese cities go through extreme upgrades, wouldn’t 
these Chinese tourist that are flocking to Hong Kong each year rather stay within the 
country and travel without the need for a visa? If this trend continues, everything 
Hong Kong has to offer will soon be offered in China as well. This is an extremely 
scary spectacle for the Hong Kong people who have enjoyed the spotlight for the 
best part of a century. It is a direct hit to the city’s pride and the city’s morale. It is no 
wonder many of the Hong Kong people resent Chinese businesses. 
Despite the growing potential economical downfall of Hong Kong, The city 
still possesses a few unique and redeeming qualities that are of great value to China. 
Hong Kong functions on a completely free market economy that has a high volume 
international trade with all corners of the globe. As a result, many Chinese 
companies that seek overseas listings, often list in Hong Kong due to its status as a 
premier financial center. In 2011, about 43% of companies listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange were Chinese companies, and these companies account for about 
56% of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s market capitalization (The CIA World 
Factbook - China). Furthermore, Hong Kong’s relatively liberal and democratic 
administration is perhaps the biggest appeal to China. Its service industry is 
incredibly advanced and established compared to that of China’s. Its government 
benefits and standards of living are far superior to majority of the places in China, 
with exception to the large metropolitan cities or special economic zones, such as 
Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen or Chongqing. 
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Moving forward, Hong Kong must acknowledge that it no longer holds an 
integral position in China’s economic growth, and may even face potential economic 
regression. It is also important to understand that Hong Kong’s relationship with the 
Chinese extends far beyond its economic ties.  
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Chapter 2 – One Country One System 
 The political dynamic of an institution or an organization is always essential 
to its economic and social prosperity. For example, a well-managed company that 
utilizes all its resources and capital efficiently and creates a “healthy” working 
environment for its employees, will not only rake in high returns, but will also 
create a great sense of cohesiveness within the company. In colloquial terms, this is 
called a “well-oiled machine”, and politics is the key to creating and maintaining this 
“well-oiled machine”. The political dynamic of a country is perhaps the most crucial 
factor for its success. The politics of a country is not just about raising the GDP or 
satisfying everyone’s need. The politics of a country is so much more complex. 
History has proven that there is no black and white or right or wrong solution, when 
it comes to the issue of politics. Leaders and administrative bodies of nations have 
always cited their motivation to “do what is best for the country”, but who decides 
what is best for the country? Such a horribly subjective and abstract idea can “make 
or break” a country. 
 In the next 35 years, China has an incredibly difficult decision to make. This 
decision has to do with the political fate of the Special Administrative Region of 
Hong Kong. In 1842, when the Treaty of Nanking was signed, Hong Kong would 
become a crown colony of Great Britain until 1997, where its sovereignty would be 
handed back to China. In the early stages of Hong Kong role as Great Britain’s crown 
colony, it was only a small port with a population of under 10,000, but due to its 
central geographical location in Asia, Hong Kong was transformed into a prominent 
metropolitan financial powerhouse. Since the post-Mao era of the Chinese 
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administration, Hong Kong has played a key role in China’s economic progress and 
success, acting as a gateway and an offshore management center for business that 
plan to enter into China. Much of Hong Kong’s value and appeal lies in the fact that 
its government is relatively much more liberal and democratic in comparison to the 
Chinese government. These two key aspects of a free market economy and a 
comparatively liberal and democratic society is the make-up of the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. 
 Hong Kong sports a very unique administration that was installed as a result 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was signed by Deng Xiaoping and 
Margaret Thatcher in 1984. The declaration basically states that after the handover 
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997, China are required to preserve the political and 
economy autonomy of Hong Kong for 50 years, thus giving birth to the first-of-its-
kind principle of One Country Two System (Horlemann). Soon after the signing of 
the declaration, the first draft of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the city’s constitution. The 
Basic Law was drafted by a drafting committee, which consisted of important 
government officials from both Hong Kong and China. Its purpose was to create a 
fundamental blueprint for HKSAR’s functionality and management. It was quickly 
established in the Basic Law that Hong Kong’s allegiance was first and foremost, to 
China. Furthermore, Hong Kong autonomy is a privilege granted and approved by 
the National People’s Congress of China. As article 1 and 2 of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law states: 
Article 1 reads: 
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People’s 
Republic of China.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR) 
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Article 2 reads: 
“The National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Law.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR)  
 
While the two initial articles of the Basic Law do not hold more weight than other 
articles do, it provides insight about the drafting process. As the drafting committee 
consists of members of both Hong Kong and Chinese administration, it was 
important for the members of the Chinese administration to establish the fact that 
despite Hong Kong’s autonomous privileges, it was very important to remember 
that Hong Kong was functioning under the umbrella of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
 The 1997 handover was met with a lot of hostility. Many people were 
extremely worried about what would happen to Hong Kong’s sovereignty under 
China, particularly due to the events that happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
The Tiananmen Square incident was incited by death of Hu Yaobang, who served as 
the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary in 1980. Hu was an avid reformer 
who believed in channeling this discontent of the public as well as increased 
liberalization within China. During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, the CCP’s chairman, 
was the supreme leader of the CCP. He ran an incredibly rigid administration, 
mainly focusing on economic reforms and allowing little space for social reform. 
Hu’s was forced to resign in 1986 because of his open criticism of the Party’s top-
ranking officials. Due to his ideas for liberalization, Hu gained a large following 
amongst the country’s youth and student population. His sudden death in 1989 was 
the main trigger for the students’ march on Tiananmen Square, a march that was 
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met with brute force from the CCP government. The time gap between the 
Tiananmen incident and Hong Kong’s handover was only a short eight years. Any 
fear from the Hong Kong was arguably justified. By 1997, the uncertainty drove 
many Hong Kong citizens to actively seek one-way routes out of Hong Kong. Many of 
them immigrating to places such as Canada, Great Britain, America and Australia.  
 In retrospect, Hong Kong’s mass exodus in the mid 90s was somewhat 
irrational. People left because they feared China’s rule would spillover, reinstalling 
Hong Kong’s identity as apart of China. To a certain extent, much of Hong Kong’s 
pride derives from the fact that such a small city possesses so much power and 
influence over its own territory as well as the region. It is in a sense, Hong Kong’s 
integrity to have the power to make its own decisions, which of course is resulted 
from the colonization of Great Britain. The People’s Republic of China, however, did 
not ever allow such political or economic freedom to any region of the country. As a 
communist state, it is essential to have a centralized and concentrated power 
structure, where the central government has absolute control over all aspects of the 
country. In the past 20-30 years, China has started to undergo a gradual de-
centralization, where some of the country’s planning and decision-making authority 
has been diluted to a provincial level. Despite China’s progressive stray from 
communist structure and fundamentals, its political and economic functionality is 
still extremely restricted as compared to Hong Kong’s political and economic 
functionality. The creation of One Country Two System effectively eliminated the 
need for China to reformat Hong Kong’s government and also helped avoid any 
major social uproar and helped preserve much of Hong Kong’s intrinsic value.  
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The One Country Two System principle has definitely been hugely beneficial 
and successful for both China as well as Hong Kong, in terms of sustaining Hong 
Kong’s role as an international financial center, which is also beneficial to China, and 
preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy. However, there are a few major problems that 
have been caused by the One Country Two System principle. When examined 
closely, the One Country Two System is in fact just a temporary barrier that slows 
down the inevitable assimilation between Hong Kong and China. In this scenario 
where 1.3 billion people and 7 million people have to find a way to get along, who do 
you think holds that power and who do you think will be the one to make changes?  
Despite One Country Two System and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, there is a 
conspicuous pattern that proves that China’s is slowly but surely taking charge. 
Firstly, the Mainland Chinese hugely influenced the drafting process of Hong Kong’s 
Basic Law, not only due to the fact that the drafting committee consisted of Chinese 
members, but also due to relative bargaining power both parties had at the time. 
The One Country Two System was a sign of leniency and mercy granted by the 
Chinese government. The most important thing to understand about One Country 
Two System is that all of Hong Kong’s liberties and rights are protected by the 
Chinese government, and that it is a privilege, as stated in article 1 & 2 of the Basic 
Law. Second and thirdly, Hong Kong’s government is divided into three main 
branches, the Judicial Council, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. The 
Chinese government has extended its influence deep into the Executive and 
Legislative Council. Hong Kong’s “leader” is known as the Chief Executive and 
according to the Basic Law, the CE is to be appointed by the Central People’s 
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Government and selected through elections, which means that the appointment of a 
CE can only be legitimized by the CPG. Furthermore, each CE is to serve in five-year 
terms and serve a maximum of two consecutive terms (China – The Basic Law of 
HKSAR). Since the 1997 handover until now, there have been a total of three CEs. 
And since 1997, the Chinese government has been passively nudging party-
approved candidates to run for election, by “endorsing” these candidates publically. 
Prior to 1997, Tung Chee Hwa was identified as the “ideal” candidate for the post of 
Chief Executive, mainly because of his background as a businessman and his vision 
of helping Hong Kong become an economic center that would play an integral role in 
the reform and modernization of China (Horlemann).  In 2005, Tung Chee Hwa 
stepped down due to a combination of poor performance and health problems. 
However, the Hong Kong media attributed Tung’s resignation to the loss of support 
from the PRC government. After Tung’s resignation, Donald Tsang, who was Hong 
Kong’s Chief Secretary of Administration (Hong Kong’s #2), received the full support 
of the PRC government to take over as the CE. Due to an incomplete term from Tung, 
Tsang had to complete the rest of Tung’s term as acting CE and run for office once 
again in 2007. In 2007, Tsang was reelected as Hong Kong’s CE, winning over 80% 
of the votes from the election committee (Chen Te-Ping, Chester Yung – 
online.wsj.com).  In 2012, Hong Kong’s CE elections were full of conspiracy.  The 
candidate endorsed by the PRC Government, Henry Tang, was plagued with rumors 
of an affair as well as allegations for violating construction laws during the 
construction of his home. This caused the PRC to withdraw their endorsement for 
this candidate. Tang would lose the election to Leung Chun Ying in a landslide 
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victory. While public endorsements can be effective, the most crucial aspect to Hong 
Kong’s CE election is the election committee, which now consists of 1,200 members 
elected from 28 functional constituencies, such as agriculture, real estate and 
finance, that each gets an assigned number of seats. The National People’s Congress 
also gets 36 seats in the committee (2011 Election Committee Subsector Elections). 
Many people voiced concerns about the members of the committee. Citing the 
reason that many of the members are Hong Kong’s richest, all of who have a lot of 
business in China. The most prominent members of the committee include business 
magnet, Li Ka Shing, Hong Kong’s richest man and the 9th richest in the world and 
Thomas Kwok, co-chairman of Hong Kong’s largest real estate developer, Sun Hung 
Ki. With a portion of the election committee affiliated with the PRC in some form 
another, steering the outcome of the election would not be difficult.  
Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, also known as LEGCO, has perhaps 
encountered the largest amount of coercion from the PRC government. As a city 
operating under its own administration while operating within the guidelines of the 
PRC, the legislative process is not going to be straight forward, especially when the 
PRC government has been very much involved with Hong Kong’s policy making 
process since the drafting of the Basic Law. In September of 2002, the proposal for 
the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was submitted to LEGCO 
(News.gov.hk – LCQ2).  
Article 23 states: 
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact law on its own to prevent 
any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s 
Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or 
bodies from conducting political activities in the region, and to prohibit political 
 27
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political 
organizations or bodies.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR) 
 
What this essentially means is that the PRC intends to implement precautionary 
measures against potential threats to national security within the Hong Kong 
government. If implemented, this policy effectively gives the city’s judicial arm much 
more power and authority. It would also limit many liberties that the Hong Kong 
people enjoy, such as their freedom of speech, protest and information. Article 23 
was basically an attempt to completely reformat Hong Kong’s judicial system to 
operate in a similar fashion to the PRC’s judicial body. This was by far the most 
drastic step from the PRC to imprint its control on the Hong Kong community. The 
drafting process was expedited by the Central People’s Government, as they had 
pressure the CE then, Tung, into passing the legislation quickly. As the CE, Tung did 
not have authority over LEGCO but he did hold the power to authorize legislations, 
because part of the CE’s responsibility is drafting and approving legislations 
(Horlemann). There were rumors that Tung was under an abnormal amount of 
pressure from the CPG due to a personal debt that he owed to the CPG government. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Tung’s company was saved from bankruptcy by a 
US$100 million loan from a Mainland Chinese enterprise and tacitly accepted by the 
Chinese government. His firm is now one of the world’s largest shipping 
conglomerates and has a large amount trade with China (Horlemann). The proposal 
for the implementation of article 23 was 76 pages long with an extremely detailed 
description of all the terms like treason, secession, sedition and subversion. Even 
the penalties for any offenses that qualify as treason, secession, sedition and 
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subversion are clearly outlined in the document. For example, when dealing with 
“seditious” publications, this is the suggested response: 
“Given the serious consequences that may be brought about by publications 
endangering national security, the existing penalties are on the low side. We suggest 
7 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $500,000 to act as an effective deterrent. The 
publications should be forfeited.” (News.gov.hk – LCQ2) 
 
Despite the longevity of the document, it still fails to provide an adequate 
explanation of what types of material or publications qualify as treasonous or 
seditious, which means that any type of judgment will be interpreted by the Central 
People’s Government. Not only does article 23 indirectly violate many of the Basic 
Laws that were put in place to protect Hong Kong’s liberties, it also gives the CPG a 
certain amount of control over Hong Kong’s judicial and legislative process. 
 The initial reaction to article 23 from the Hong Kong people was absolutely 
disastrous (needless to say). Before article 23 was passed and within two months of 
its appearance in LEGCO, there were already around 65,000 thousand people 
protesting against the legislation. Furthermore, about 190,000 people had signed a 
petition against the legislation. On July 1st of 2003, a large scale protest was 
organized to show the Hong Kong people’s disapproval toward the Hong Kong 
government, the Chinese government for trying to implement article 23 of the Basic 
Law. According to reports, the initial protest had a predicted attendance of around 
20,000 but according to the police and protestors, there was upwards of half a 
million people present at the protest (China Review after HK Protest – cnn.com). 
The implementation of article 23 has since been shelved indefinitely due to the 
major public uproar. The July 1st protest has now become an annual event, where 
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the Hong Kong people continue to voice their disapproval of the government; the 
attendance of the protest is also steadily rising. 
 It is easy to pinpoint the areas of Hong Kong’s government that are 
influenced by the PRC government. And to a certain degree, some form of political 
assimilation could be beneficial. However, the changes that the Chinese government 
has attempted to make have caused a lot of resentment toward the PRC within the 
Hong Kong community. It is in Hong Kong and China’s best interest to slow down 
the bridging of administration because democracy and communism are too 
fundamentally different to convert one to the other overnight. While Hong Kong’s 
political future is still very much unrevealed, there have been signs of restriction 
coming from the PRC. According to article 45 of the Basic Law: 
“…The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the 
actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance 
with the principle of gradual and orderly process. The ultimate aim is the selection of 
the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedure.” (China – The Basic 
Law of HKSAR) 
 
The Hong Kong government had aimed to elect a CE through universal suffrage after 
the 2007 elections, but the CPG has blocked that possibility, stating that Hong 
Kong’s CE will continue to be elected by its election committee and appointed by the 
People’s Congress. There have been no other recent reports of when or if Hong 
Kong’s election process will ever achieve universal suffrage. There might be an 
impending doom for Hong Kong’s administration merely based on the fact that the 
CPG has time and time again neglected the laws from the Basic Law, which they in 
fact helped create, interpreting these laws in their favor, or just completely 
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reinterpreting them. The One Country Two System might just be a force field filled 
with holes.  
 The political relationship between Hong Kong and China is perhaps the most 
sensitive aspect, due to the fact that it holds the key to determining the fate of Hong 
Kong’s future autonomous status. The few attempts the PRC government made to 
impose policies on Hong Kong have ended in catastrophe, as seen with Hong Kong’s 
response to article 23 of the Basic Law. As long as the One Country Two System is in 
place, it provides the Hong Kong community with the necessary platform and 
freedoms to reject any form of Chinese imposition. This begs to question how the 
PRC government would handle the Hong Kong community if the One Country Two 
System were not in effect.   
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Chapter 3 – Who Needs Border Control? 
 
 The island of Hong Kong is located in the Southeastern border of China. It has 
a total landmass of 1,104 km2 and is home to 7.2 million people. It is one of the most 
densely populated cities in the world with a land-per-capita of about only 6.5 m2 
(The CIA World Factbook – Hong Kong). As such a small and dense city, it is crucial 
to ensure that the population has a dependable supply of food, water, electricity and 
shelter. As an autonomous extension of the PRC, many of such resources are 
imported by the PRC, and as a prominent port city, countries in Southeast Asia can 
also import other resources.  
A metropolitan city such as Hong Kong relies greatly on its service industry 
and especially with a massively increasing amount of Chinese tourists visiting each 
year, with 28 million from 2011, approximately a 100% increase since 2007 (Lim, 
Louisa – npr.com), tourism plays a major part is the city’s economic growth. The 
increasing amounts of tourists are tremendous for the economy, but what happens 
when the tourists begin to compete for resources with the local people? What 
happens when the tourists want to stay? Hong Kong is now facing such a problem.  
Chinese tourists spent a total $14 billion, last year, a 35% increase from the 
year before (Lim, Louisa – npr.com). Large conglomerates, chain stores and real 
estate moguls who have stores or property in central business districts such as 
Central, Causeway Bay or Tsim Sha Tsui have been on the receiving end of a 
seemingly endless and increasing gold mine. Because Hong Kong has no sales tax, 
international luxury brands, such as Gucci, Prada, Chanel, Dolce & Gabbana have 
been major beneficiaries of the Chinese tourism surge. The spending prowess of the 
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Chinese tourists has created the preferential treatment of store customers. Store 
salesmen of these luxury brands, flock towards customers who speak mandarin as 
supposed to locals who speak Cantonese. According to the US department of 
Commerce, studies have shown that Chinese tourists outspend all other foreign 
tourists while on holiday in the US, spending an average of around $6,200 per 
person (not including transportation, hotel or food), compared to the average 
spending of all other foreign tourists of around $4,000 per person (not including 
transportation, hotel or food) (Lim, Louisa – npr.com). This extra tendency to 
“splurge” by Chinese tourists has caused store salesmen to completely neglect local 
shoppers because of their more conservative spending habits. In January of 2012, 
the flagship store of Dolce & Gabbana, an international luxury brand, caused a huge 
uproar within Hong Kong community by prohibiting any photo taking in front of 
the store. Mainland Chinese tourist were apparently exempted from this rule, where 
a security guard allegedly told the Hong Kong photographers to “get lost” and that 
only mainland Chinese tourists are allowed to take pictures of the storefront. The 
main concern of the public was that how can a store hold the authority to determine 
the photography privileges of Hong Kong’s public space, and furthermore reserving 
that privilege for Chinese tourists because of their spending habits. Within the week 
of the incident, over a thousand protestors crowded in front of the store located in 
the central shopping district of Tsim Sha Tsui, chanting against the discrimination of 
Hong Kongers. The police barricaded the store the store was forced to close early. 
The head offices of Dolce & Gabbana have since issued a public apology to the Hong 
Kong people regarding the incident. This incident was an isolated and extreme case; 
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however, it highlights the preferential treatment toward the free spending Chinese 
tourists and creates a tremendous amount of tension between the Hong Kong and 
the Chinese. 
Hong Kong has superb benefits and government support. All Hong Kong 
citizens are entitled to twelve years of complimentary education, first class 
healthcare, benefits that are funded by Hong Kong taxpayers. For the past couple of 
years, the Mainland Chinese have attempted to “get in on the action.” Not only do 
they account for two thirds of all of Hong Kong’s tourists, 40% of babies born in 
Hong Kong in 2011 belonged to mothers from Mainland China. This staggering 
statistic is perhaps even more harmful than the flooding of Chinese tourists.  
The birth of these babies can potentially cause many problems in the future, 
especially in the next twenty years. These babies with Mainland Chinese mothers 
whom are born in Hong Kong are now automatically eligible to become permanent 
Hong Kong residences and are then entitled to all the benefits that the Hong Kong 
government provides, which include, twelve complimentary years of education, 
government supported healthcare and other benefits that are unavailable in China. 
This effectively creates the problem of “representation without taxation.” The fact 
that these babies are born to non-Hong Kong parents also means that their parents 
do not pay Hong Kong taxes, and yet their children are entitled to the benefits 
funded by Hong Kong taxpayers. This poses a potential economic problem. It is also 
speculated that these Chinese families are determined to give birth in Hong Kong to 
escape the family planning restrictions of China, such as the One Child Policy, or to 
escape the restrictions of the Houkou, the household registration system. Since 
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Hong Kong is an autonomous region, it is exempted from all restrictions from the 
CCP government.  
One of the problems that Hong Kong born Mainland Chinese babies causes is 
the exacerbation of a growing aging problem within Hong Kong. As of 2011, Hong 
Kong population age structure is as followed: the population aged 0 – 14 years of 
age, take up 11.6% of the city’s population; the population aged 15 – 65 years of age, 
take up 74.8% of the city’s population, and the population aged 65 years of age and 
above, take up 13.5% of the city’s population. Hong Kong also has an exceedingly 
high average life expectancy of 82.12 years, the 8th highest in the world. It also has a 
very low fertility rate of 1.09 children born per woman, the 3rd lowest of any place in 
the world, only above Macau and Singapore, and a birth rate of 7.54 births per 1,000 
population and a death rate of 7.23 per 1,000 population (The CIA World Factbook – 
Hong Kong). What do these statistics mean? With the majority of the present 
population within the age range of 15 – 65, it means that, presently, the majority of 
the population is part of the city’s work force, and with such a low fertility and birth 
rate, the work force will only shrink in size. The high life expectancy, partnered with 
the low fertility rate, means that the percentage of the population aged 65 and older, 
will only increase. This means that an increase in government expenditure for 
government supported healthcare programs for the elderly is inevitable. In 2005, 
the Hong Kong government spent $14 billion on elderly medical programs; this 
number will increase substantially under the city’s current population trend. With 
the birth rate and death rate almost equal, it means that the population size has 
essentially “plateaued”. How does the influx of Hong Kong born Chinese babies fit 
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into this population trend? Hong Kong is essentially used as a medium for these 
mothers to deliver their babies to bypass the restrictions of the Chinese 
government, but the parents of the these babies do not have the right to abode in 
Hong Kong; therefore, these babies that are born in Hong Kong will return to China 
after birth. And since 40% of Hong Kong’s babies from 2011, are born to Mainland 
Chinese mothers, it lowers the replacement rate of the city’s aging work force 
substantially. This means that in about 15 – 20 years, Hong Kong’s work force will 
have a sudden drop off, which could potentially be very detrimental to the city’s 
development. 
Another problem that these Hong Kong born Chinese babies poses is the 
cultural repercussions. Hong Kong has a very strong cultural identity. It is an 
identity fostered and developed from the collective influences of British colonization 
and Chinese roots, and it is unique to people who were born and raised in Hong 
Kong. This cultural identity is partially the cause of the current tension between 
Hong Kong and China. Since the 1997 handover, Hong Kong has been resisting and 
rejecting the inevitable cultural changes. These changes are in a way more powerful 
than government policies. These changes will be subconsciously implemented 
incrementally from generation to generation, until the point where a new identity is 
formed and completely replaces and erases the traces of the previous identity. Hong 
Kong is now experiencing the “de-British-ization” or the “Chinese-ification” of a new 
era. The former generations of British colonization distanced itself from its Chinese 
roots but newer generations will become more and more welcoming to Chinese 
culture. This process will be expedited by the influx of Hong Kong born Chinese. The 
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40% Hong Kong born Chinese of 2011 and the “x”% of Hong Kong born Chinese of 
future years will dilute this anti-China sentiment and bring Hong Kong culture 
closer to China.  
Perhaps the most problematic issue is the matter of resources. In 2011, there 
were a total of 43,982 Mainland women who gave birth in Hong Kong, as compared 
to the 7,810 in 2001 (Hong Kong - LegCo). This major increase is can be attributed 
to the loosened border-crossing policies and restrictions. Another staggering 
statistic is the number of Mainland women who gave birth in Hong Kong with 
spouses who were non-Hong Kong residents. In 2011, 35,736 Mainland women who 
gave birth in Hong Kong had spouses who were non-Hong Kong residents, 81.3% of 
the total number Mainland women, as compared to the 620 in 2001, only 7.9% of 
that year’s total number (Hong Kong - LegCo). This means that in 2001, most of the 
babies born from Mainland women were because of “cross-border” relations or 
marriages, which makes the births more “legitimate” and suggests that those 
women were entitled to the access of Hong Kong’s healthcare because of their 
spouse. In 2011, 81.3% of the families who came to Hong Kong to give birth, only 
came to Hong Kong for the sole purpose of gaining access to Hong Kong’s medical 
resources and obtaining permanent residencies for their children. These families 
end up competing with local mothers for spaces in maternities wards, and while 
these families and local mothers pay the same amount of money for the use of 
maternity wards, local mothers pay Hong Kong taxes, which incites the debate of 
whether these local mothers should have priority access to the Hong Kong 
maternity wards. Maggie Wong, a 31-year-old office clerk and a lifelong Hong Kong 
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resident gave birth to twins eight months ago. Three and a half months into her 
pregnancy, she wanted to schedule an appointment with maternity wards of public 
hospitals because it is much cheaper than the maternity wards of private hospitals. 
However, all the dates around her expected due date were all booked up by 
pregnant women from the Mainland, forcing her to have to make an appointment at 
a private hospital and use her husband’s life savings and borrow money from her 
parents. Her concern was that, as a Hong Kong taxpayer and a permanent resident, 
why did she not have access to benefits that she was entitled to? On top of that, she 
was also forced to add to her family’s financial burden just to ensure the healthy and 
safe birth of her children (LeFraniere, Sharon – nytimes.com).  
After much public outcry and protest from the Hong Kong community, the 
Hong Kong government has began to issue new regulations to combat the increasing 
number of Mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong. Firstly, starting with the 
year 2012, the Hong Kong government has agreed to lower the quota for the 
number of pregnant Mainland women allowed to give birth in Hong Kong to 35,000, 
3,400 spots in public hospitals and 31,000 spots in private hospitals, after a total of 
43,982 Mainland women gave birth in Hong Kong in 2011 (Hong Kong - LegCo). On 
top of this, Mainland women who want to give birth in Hong Kong must have a prior 
appointment with a Hong Kong hospital and the correct certification obtained 
through scheduled prenatal checks with the hospital, in order to be granted access 
to Hong Kong’s maternity wards, regardless of whether it is a public or private 
hospital. Despite such strict regulations, many Mainland women still find ways to 
by-pass these rules (Hong Kong - LegCo). In the year 2011, around 1,657 Mainland 
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women gave birth in the Accident & Emergency department of Hong Kong hospitals, 
the emergency room (Hong Kong - LegCo). This not only disrupts the operation of 
the ER of these hospitals but also endangers the mothers and babies because the 
ER’s are not equipped with the suitable equipment and staff for delivering a baby. 
This is known as “gate-crashing.” These Mainland mothers scheme to give birth in 
the ER by taking private cross-boundary vehicles, or by simply wearing baggy 
clothing that conceals any sign of pregnancy, because they did not have a prior 
appointment with a Hong Kong hospital or that they did not have the required 
certification (Hong Kong - LegCo). In a LEGCO meeting held in February 2012, it was 
agreed that tightening border control and eliminating third party intermediaries 
were the best ways to eliminate “gate-crashing.” An increase of immigration officers 
and medical personnel at immigration control points would be set up to spot these 
Mainland women who try to enter the city without the correct documentation or 
certification. Cooperation with the Mainland border control is also crucial to the 
process. The Hong Kong Hospital Authority has also implemented higher rates for 
Mainland women who want to access to Hong Kong’s maternity wards, where the 
fees are solely based on the status of the pregnant woman (Hong Kong - LegCo). It 
was also agreed that local women who were permanent residences of Hong Kong 
would get priority access to the maternity wards of all Hong Kong hospitals.  
Hong Kong’s newly elected CE, Leung Chun Ying, has already taken the first 
steps to tightening regulations against pregnant women from Mainland China. 
Leung proposed a “zero-quota” plan for Mainland Chinese pregnant women who do 
not have spouses who are not Hong Kong citizens. The zero-quota plan only applies 
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to Hong Kong’s private hospitals. The 12 members of Hong Kong’s Private Hospital 
Association agreed that, all private hospitals would only provide obstetrics services 
to mainland women married to Hong Kong citizens. Leung’s plan also included a 
section that raised the possibility of not guaranteeing citizenship to all children born 
to mainland parent in Hong Kong. While Leung’s plan is a solid first step to 
preserving Hong Kong’s benefits, it may cause a significant increase in obstetric 
units in public hospitals, which could be problematic because many maternity 
wards in public hospitals are understaffed and underfunded (Mok, Danny – 
scmp.com). 
It is important to understand that the reason Hong Kong is so appealing to 
the Mainland Chinese, is because Hong Kong has a way of life that is unattainable in 
China. However, the ways in which the Mainland Chinese are going about to obtain 
the Hong Kong benefits are causing much harm to the relationship between the 
Hong Kong community and Chinese. New regulations such as free trade agreements 
have relaxed border control between China and Hong Kong but it will be crucial to 
regulate Mainland China’s access into China to avoid creating more unnecessary 
conflict between the two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40
Chapter 4 – Please Mind the Gap between the Train and the Platform 
With the increasing amount of interaction between the Mainland Chinese and 
Hong Kong, it is vital to Hong Kong’s longevity and survival to find suitable and 
viable solutions to strengthen the hopes for brighter future under the Chinese 
umbrella. The increased numbers of Mainland Chinese in Hong Kong creates the 
feeling within the Hong Kong community that these Mainland Chinese are 
“invading” or “infiltrating” their territory. It has gotten to the point where the public 
now refers to the visiting Mainland Chinese as “locust” during protests because they 
see them as a harmful swarm that consume Hong Kong’s valuable and limited 
resources and interferes with the lives of the local residence.  
The Hong Kong people often complain that the Mainland Chinese people are 
rude and have no manners. They walk around Hong Kong as if they “own the place.” 
They ignore the peace and order that the Hong Kong people have abided by years. 
The most common examples that are cited are that the Mainland Chinese spit on the 
streets, when Hong Kong has strict penalties and fines against littering, and that the 
Mainland Chinese are always cutting in line. These examples are generalized but are, 
for the most part, true. Hong Kong society has a much stricter sense of order that 
was influenced by the British, and public order is a cornerstone to being a Hong 
Kong citizen. However, Chinese society is radically different. It is common practice 
for people to spit on the streets and disregard a line, because these actions are not 
reprimanded or frowned upon. It is simply a matter of cultural difference. Not so 
long ago, Hong Kong’s prosperity had fueled 7 million egos to look down upon the 
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struggling Mainland Chinese. Now that the roles have somewhat reversed, it creates 
a bitter feeling of becoming less important. 
It could be argued that Mainland Chinese have been wrongfully victimized or 
misunderstood. Yes, they do spend tons of money on shopping in Hong Kong, mainly 
because products are more dependable and cheaper. They want their children to be 
born in Hong Kong, simply because Hong Kong’s level of healthcare is world-class 
and also that having their children born in Hong Kong potentially promises a higher 
standard of living as well as prospective political freedom. The Mainland Chinese do 
not make these decisions with the intention of “infiltrating” or “invading” Hong 
Kong. It is simply an aftershock effect and the by-product of pursuing a “better life”, 
a misinterpretation of intention by Hong Kongers.  
In reality, Hong Kong has more control over the situation than it seems. The 
majority of the resistance and rejection of the Chinese culture is produced by the 
Hong Kong community not the Mainland Chinese. Their pride blinds them, and they 
fail to comprehend that China holds the key to their future economic, political and 
social prosperity. And by escalating this tension between with the Mainland Chinese, 
it can only damage the chances of a healthy partnership in the future.  
In early 2012, a Mainland family was in Hong Kong for holiday. While they 
were riding the MTR, Hong Kong subway system, the daughter of the family was 
eating a pack of dried noodles and apparently making a mess. Eating and drinking is 
indeed prohibited in most forms of transportation in Hong Kong, but is never 
strictly enforced. A local Hong Kong man, Ken, was quick to reprimand the Mainland 
family for allowing their daughter to eat in the train, when it is supposedly not 
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permitted. The child’s mother proceeded to engage Ken in a heated verbal exchange, 
when the easy solution would have been to ask her daughter to stop eating and 
maybe even apologize. This yelling match between the Mainland Chinese mother 
and Ken was videotaped and quick to become the next YouTube sensation in Hong 
Kong. After watching the video, there are a few things that become very evident. 
Firstly, the way the Hong Kong and Mainland bystanders quickly rallied behind each 
of their parties, until the confrontation became an argument between witnesses. 
Secondly, Ken’s argument quickly escalates from “You should not be eating in the 
train” to “This is what the Mainland people do. This is Hong Kong. Respect the rules 
of Hong Kong. Get off the train now!” This begs to question whether this 
confrontation would have even taken place if the person eating on the train was 
from Hong Kong. Third and lastly, the children from the Mainland were quick to 
admit their own mistake and even went as far as to yell out, “My mother’s the one at 
fault”, the child’s response was quickly answered by a discreet shush from her 
mother. This is when another Mainland Chinese woman joined in to provide the 
mother with reinforcements. This is the perfect embodiment of the social tension 
that exists between the Hong Kong and Chinese. It has become a competition of 
whose ego is larger, a competition of who can yell louder. The video proves that the 
Mainland Chinese people are not without reason, as the children involved were able 
to point out the party at fault, even though it was their mother. The video can also be 
used as an example of local Hong Kong people picking at the Mainland Chinese for 
miniscule things, and subsequently blowing them out of proportion.  
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Unfortunately, the controversy of the MTR incident does not end there. Kong 
Qingdong, a professor from Peking University, one of China’s most prestigious 
universities, went on an internet talk-show in China and denounced Hong Kong in 
an extreme fashion. In the video, which of course became a YouTube sensation as 
well, Kong called the Hong Kong people dogs for not speaking the national language, 
mandarin. His rationale was that all Chinese people have an obligation to know how 
to speak mandarin. While people from the north, east, south or west have their own 
dialects, they should always have mandarin as a common dialect, because it is part 
of the Chinese identity. He continues to discredit Hong Kong by saying that they all 
of their strengths as a community and city are only credited to the colonization by 
Great Britain. He also calls the Hong Kong people bastards, because they often say 
they are from Hong Kong not China. Needless to say, Kong’s video was well 
circulated in the Hong Kong community as well as the Mainland Chinese community. 
When asked about the incident, China’s Minister of Education has this to say: “We 
require our teachers to adhere to the notion that the mainland and Hong Kong are 
one family, and people from both sides should show respect towards each other.” 
Proposals to sanction the professor for misconduct have also been brought forth to 
the Ministry of Education, who has yet to produce a verdict. While Kong’s rant was 
extremely demeaning and condescending towards Hong Kong, it was not without 
truth. Yes, much of Hong Kong’s culture and identity can only be credited to the 
British, because Hong Kong was a British colony for more than a century, and before 
that Hong Kong was just a small fishing village. During the colonization under 
Britain, much of Hong Kong’s identity derived from distancing itself from China, but 
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that is now rapidly changing. The cultural assimilation between the two is 
happening much faster than the economic and political assimilation, which is one 
reason why these social tensions are escalating at such an extreme pace. Hong 
Kong’s new identity as Chinese is only 15 years old and still in a fledgling stage. It 
will certainly take more time for the cultural shift to take effect, but as new 
generations of Hong Kong people replace the old, the hostility between the Hong 
Kong and Chinese will eventually transform into the harmony of the Chinese. In the 
meantime, whatever can be done to facilitate the shift should be carried out swiftly.  
I believe the first step to reconciliation between Hong Kong and Mainland 
Chinese has to be increased awareness and mutual understanding. When examining 
the economic relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, it is exceedingly 
rare to hear about disagreements or verbal spats between parties. And the reason 
for that is because of the professional nature of the relationship. Both parties 
understand that a successful relationship will be mutually beneficial. Therefore, 
both parties make an extra effort to accommodate the other. At the general level of 
community, the situation is indeed different, but still applicable. Both the Hong Kong 
and Chinese people must understand that under the right leadership and 
cooperation, the partnership between Hong Kong and China can be a long lasting 
and prosperous one. Much of the disagreement between the two parties stems from 
the lower to middle class that lack exposure to one another. Recently, the Hong 
Kong and Chinese online community has been engaging in an unhealthy exchange of 
jabs. This confrontation, which is exclusively within the internet communities, was 
fueled by events such as the MTR argument and the large increase of pregnant 
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Mainland women in Hong Kong. The 
“patient-zero” of this war of ad 
campaigns depicted a large locust 
sitting atop of Hong Kong’s iconic Lion 
Rock with the Victoria Harbor in the 
background, and in bold words it says: 
“Are you willing for Hong Kong to 
spend $1,000,000 per 18 minutes to 
accommodate foreign born children? 
The Hong Kong people have had 
enough!” Furthermore, the ad requests 
that the Hong Kong government reinterpret article 24 of the Basic Law, which states 
the guidelines and requirements to the right to abode in Hong Kong (see figure 3). 
These posters were published in all major Hong Kong newspapers, taking up an 
entire page and served as a sarcastic metaphor for the mainlanders’ consumption of 
Hong Kong’s resources. This poster sparked a mocking response from the Mainland 
internet community. The poster depicted a child sitting on his father’s shoulder. The 
ad was meant to emphasize the fact that the Chinese government (the father) pays 
Hong Kong (the son) over $200 billion Yuan a year, referring to the spending of 
Mainland Chinese tourists each year (Chow, Vivienne – South China Morning Post). 
The respective internet communities would continue in the form of 
responserebuttalresponse. All of these campaign posters are extremely 
demeaning to the other party; both parties touch on the fact that they are merely 
Figure 3 Hong Kong’s locust poster 
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“tolerating” the other not “accepting” them. This again has to do with the lack of 
exposure between the two. The large amounts of Mainland tourists who come to 
Hong Kong for holiday are from the upper echelons of Chinese society, the 28 
million tourists who come to Hong Kong, barely account for 0.02% of China’s 
population. While a trip to Hong Kong may not be able to be afforded by most, 
government sponsored initiatives, such as the Asia Society, which was a highly 
successful foundation founded by the Rockefellers to attempt to bridge the gap 
between the East and the West, between Hong Kong and China could help bridge the 
social gap between the people of lower to middle class. Furthermore, both 
governments must play a more active role in discouraging the criticism of the 
opposing party. A healthy and demonstrative relationship between the two 
governments could be a suitable role model for future generations to follow.  
Another important and helpful factor that could be a defining factor in the 
Sino-Hong Kong relationship is the politics of language. The national language of 
China is mandarin and yet there are up to 250 languages spoken within China. 
Cantonese is one of the most commonly spoken Chinese dialects. It is the main 
dialect spoken by the Hong Kong people. Since its days of colonization, the teaching 
and learning of English was greatly endorsed for obvious reasons. However, since 
the 1997 handover, the emphasis has shifted and most Hong Kong schools now have 
required mandarin as a subject. Globalizing mandarin as a first language along with 
Cantonese in Hong Kong will be one of Hong Kong’s most vital steps to creating its 
Chinese identity. Hong Kong people are notoriously bad mandarin speakers. The 
canton accent mandarin is a common joke within China and Hong Kong. Therefore, 
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it is important for the older generations to improve on their mandarin as well. Not 
only will Hong Kong’s learning and improving of their mandarin be a sign of good 
faith toward the Mainland Chinese, but will also serve as a public indication that 
Hong Kong is a part of China and Hong Kong people are from China. 
There is definitely no guaranteed solution to resolving the current tension 
between the Mainland Chinese and the Hong Kongers, but the most important step 
for both parties is to understand and acknowledge the causes and reasons behind 
the conflict. Most often times, tensions that arise between cultures are caused by of 
clash of values and beliefs. This tension is further reinforced by ego and pride in 
respective cultures. Appeasing the tension should start by identifying the exact 
areas of conflict between the cultures. In the case of Hong Kongers and the Mainland 
Chinese, mutual acceptance is the most crucial step. As the largest country in the 
world in terms of population, China is home to many different cultures but is yet 
able to avoid domestic cultural conflicts. Why is that? It is because all these cultures 
ultimately acknowledge themselves as apart of the greater category of being from 
China. The Hong Kongers and the Mainland Chinese view each other as foreigners. 
The next step is relinquishing cultural pride. Whether Hong Kongers accept it or not, 
Hong Kong is now and forever will be apart of China. Becoming more “Chinese” is 
not betraying or surrendering the Hong Kong culture, but honoring and preserving 
it. It is a Hong Kong misconception that the Chinese government is actively trying to 
limit Hong Kong’s freedoms and rights but that is not necessarily true. It is also a 
Hong Kong misconception that accepting the Chinese culture means that Hong 
Kongers will have to walk, talk or act like the Mainland Chinese, which is also not 
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true. It is quite the opposite. Hong Kong is most valuable to China as a cooperative 
political and economic haven and the chances of protecting Hong Kong’s rights and 
liberties might actually be enhanced if the city peacefully cooperated with the 
Chinese government.   
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Conclusion – What next? 
 What next? This billion-dollar question does not yet have a definite answer, 
but educated predictions can certainly be provided. Based on the factors examined 
in my thesis: the social effects of China’s growing economy, Hong Kong’s 
autonomous Status and Hong Kong’s resource constraints, I believe that Hong 
Kong’s fate is determinant of one single factor; becoming “Chinese.” Based on my 
findings, in all three cases, the Hong Kong people feel threatened by the Mainland 
Chinese people’s money and demeanor because they view them as foreigners. The 
Hong Kong community must acknowledge and accept the fact that in order to 
preserve the city’s integrity, they must embrace their new identity, by welcoming 
the imminent assimilation of Hong Kong and China. They must accept that they are 
Chinese and they are from China, and that China’s progress is their progress.  
 The assimilation of two cultures with fundamentally different backgrounds 
of development and prosperity is, without a doubt, extremely difficult. When dealing 
with cultural assimilation, the emergence of cross-cultural conflict or tension is 
often times inevitable. These conflicts are most often incited by inequalities and 
clashes in belief systems. Therefore, attempts to adjust these conflicts have to be 
approached carefully and sensitively, as any irrational actions can lead to masses of 
disgruntled people. In Hong Kong and Mainland China’s case, the cultural tension 
stems from the PRC government’s “preferential treatment” of Hong Kong and the 
Mainland Chinese people’s exploitation of Hong Kong resources. Currently, there are 
several emerging factors that could help the situation. Firstly, the new CE’s zero-
quota for Mainland pregnant women in private hospitals could improve the tension. 
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Despite the fact that it gives a feeling that the Mainland Chinese are not allowed 
access to Hong Kong resources, it is very important for the Hong Kong people to feel 
that their government is trying to protect their people and their rights. Secondly, 
there have been reports of Hong Kong switching its driving lane and the driver’s 
seat to the right, in order to match China’s road systems and increase direct traffic 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Policies such as these will certainly be 
incredibly difficult to implement not only because of the amount of cars that Hong 
Kong has, but also because switching lanes would potentially cause many traffic 
accidents. These ideas are a good starting point to establishing a healthy link 
between Hong Kong and China.  
 Hong Kong’s economic stature will surely diminish with the stable and 
phenomenal growth from the Chinese economy. Hong Kong’s autonomy may 
continue to be preserved by the PRC government in order to prevent any major 
dissent. The city’s resources will have to be regulated more strictly by the Hong 
Kong government to prevent any negative repercussions. Expect to see the Hong 
Kong and PRC government work much more closely, and the PRC government’s role 
and presence in Hong Kong progressively increase. If my predictions and analysis 
are accurate, the outlook for Hong Kong and China continues to look bright and 
promising.   
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